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'' ^ "N DICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to I Jtah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(a), Utah Code Ann. § o.Mw.-.- i • .u,*-. , ,.m . w,i, \mi. § 78- 2a 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues and standard of appellate review are satisfactorily presented in 
Petitioner's brief Workers Compensation Kind ^ui;i,,n.> ;,u, .,uui
 L>u.v.iv m response to 
Petitiunei \ aij-'iinn'iil Ikil Woikus ('omp. r^  = »'•. , - i OT.MI- Iwi ,i 
portion of Ms. Wood's permanent partial impairment and medical expenses. 
DETERMINATIVE I, AW 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A • 2 • 412(6)(c)(ii): 
Permanent partial disability compensationh may not be paid for any 
permanent impairment that existed prior to an industrial accident. 
F< jft Cock \ I I I I . §34\ - -1 10?P) 
.-, ,eci u> ihe limitations proviocu m mis uiapiu aim umess otllerwise 
noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, and 
Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act, are incorporated into 
this chapter and shall be applied to occupational disease claims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103: 
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable v>ccupational disease 
1 
means any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of 
employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that 
employment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108(2)(b): 
The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the employee first 
suffered disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the 
occupational disease was caused by employment.. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105: 
See Appendix B 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110: 
See Appendix B 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The nature of the case, course of proceedings and relevant facts are satisfactorily set 
forth in Petitioner's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) concurs in Bryner Clinic / IHC Risk 
Management's (BC/IHC) argument that the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted 
and applied Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-3-110(1) to the facts of this case. The Labor 
Commission did not err, however, in holding BC/IHC solely liable for workers 
compensation benefits attributable to Ms. Wood's occupational exposure to latex while 
employed at the Bryner Clinic. 
2 
ARGUMEN I 
Utah law places the entire workers compensation liability for an 
occupational disease on the entity insuring the employer during the 
injured worker's "last injurious exposure" to the hazards of the 
disease. IHC Risk Management continuously insured Ms. Wood's 
employer (Bryner Clinic) during the last three years of her harmful 
occupational exposure to latex. Did the Commission eii in holding 
BC7IHC solely responsible for workers compensation benefits 
jfi? ^-iiiiibSr Jo Ms. Woods latex induced medical conditions? 
B( "IIM " ""otifeitds, lh;it VVC T" should he ir't|!ii!'nl h> p;iy a pioportionatr shun 
of the workers compensation benefits awarded to Ms. Woods for her exposure to 
latex while employed at the Bryner Clinic since \XC¥ insured Bryner Clinic 
.w.:iig uio 11»\o years a-M 'i-, e n\onu\:, )i . .:-. \ • silk-, The I 'iimmissum 
. • <*\h * J *'• • . •'•:-.-':f«.nn and held BC/IHC solely liable for the benefits. 
This result is clearly mandated by Utah law. 
in l\icijic Employers Ins, Co. v. Industrial i .ommisswn of Utah, llie Utah 
Supreme ( 'ourt held ihaf the "Insl injurious e,\posiiM,p ink jpphes lo occupational 
disease cases involving a single employer with multiple insurance carriers. The 
court determined that the carrier insuring the risk at the time of the injured 
:
 .
 s
 . i * M i i s t ' w A i >' I '• '\ r 
workers compensation benefits payable as a result of the disease. The Labui 
Commission has followed Pacific Employers in assigning liability in similar 
sit uations \ s i loted ii 1 the ( xxi 1:11 nission's Oi de i :>ri I1 lo t ion for R eviev* in tl 1 z 
instant case, the only exception to the "last injurious exposure" rule is found in 
1
 157 P.2d 800 (Utah 1945) 
Ballatore v. Buehner Block, Labor Comm'n. Case No. 02-0124 (5-18-04) in Appendix B. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-3-105 which provides for apportionment of liability where 
the last injurious exposure is less than twelve months in duration.3 The 
Commission correctly observed that the facts of this case cause it to fall squarely 
within the coverage of the general rule, rather than the exception. Ms. Wood was 
last exposed to latex for nearly three years while IHC provided the Bryner Clinic's 
workers compensation insurance.4 
BC/IHC argues that Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412(6)(c)(ii) by operation of 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-102 prohibits the Commission from requiring it to pay 
compensation for the permanent impairment attributable to Ms. Wood's latex 
exposure at the Bryner Clinic prior to IHC's coverage period.5 This argument, 
however, confounds the distinction between a workers compensation occupational 
disease claim and one that arises from an industrial accident. The legislature has 
purposefully chosen to apply different legal principles to injuries caused by 
singular events (accidents) and those brought on by gradual, sustained exposures 
to harmful agents over the process of time (occupational diseases). Hence the 
reason for two separate statutes: The Workers Compensation Act and the 
Occupational Disease Act. 
J
 Order on Motion for Review, pp. 3 - 4 . See Appendix A. 
4Recoid, at 141. 
^ Brief of Appellants, p. 17 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 et. seq. and 34A-3-101 et. seq. respectively. 
4 
The reasons for this differentiation are clear. Once an accident has 
occurred, there is no compelling reason, either of substance or procedure, to 
relieve the employer/carrier of liability for the ongoing effects of that accident 
upon the injured party. A subsequent accident does not necessarily break the 
causal connection between an injured worker's current medical condition and the 
earlier accident. Impairment arising from the prior event can be evaluated at any 
time after the event and attributed to it because a medical record exists, or can be 
constructed, from the time of the occurrence forward. 
Occupational diseases are substantively different. In many cases, as in this 
one, an employer and/or its insurer "presides" over a period of exposure to a 
harmful substance or workplace condition, but is not the employer or carrier when 
the disease finally appears and gives rise to disability, impairment and the need for 
medical treatment. When the disease is discovered, and if additional harmful 
exposure has occurred after the "departure" of the earlier employer or insurer, it is 
impossible to know if there was an actual injury at the time the previous 
employment or coverage ended. No medical records would exist documenting the 
nature and extent of an injury at that moment in time. Thus, by definition, Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-412(6)(c)(ii) cannot apply. Prior to the actual manifestation 
of the disease, there is no impairment. In the instant case, the medical panel 
apportioned Ms. Wood's impairment on the basis of causal factors. Nowhere in 
7
 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co V Industrial Comm }n, 657 P 2d 764 (Utah 1983) 
5 
its report, however, did the panel ever state that any of that impairment actually 
existed prior to the time that Ms. Wood's disease became symptomatic in 1997.8 
As noted in BC/IHC's brief,9 some states have made attempts to apportion 
liability for occupational diseases among employers or sureties based on exposure 
periods. As noted, however, that is not the law in Utah,10 nor is it in most other 
jurisdictions. l The substantive difference between industrial accidents and 
occupational diseases gives rise to the need for a different means of administering 
occupational disease claims. Professor Larson observes: 
The last injurious exposure rule is particularly useful for allocating 
liability in occupational disease cases, which often involve a 
multitude of insurers.... [The] initial task of discovering even the 
names of all of the insurers at risk during the claimant's working life 
might consume months of the Board's time before it could even 
begin to assess the proportion of exposure that occurred while each 
insurer was at risk.12 
Succinctly stated, sequential industrial accidents give rise to two or more, 
distinct causes of action. Sequential harmful exposures, on the other hand, give 
1 ^ 
rise to only one cause of action. The insurer affording coverage at the time that 
one cause of action arises is the only insurer liable for the benefits payable by 
reason of the occupational disease.14 Thus, the flaw in BC/IHC's argument is 
that it does not distinguish between the multiple causes of action that arise from 
8Recoid, pp. 61-77 
9
 Buef of Appellants, p 8 
10
 Subject to the one exception piovided foi m Utah Code Ann § 34A-3-105(2) 
11
 Laison's lists 19 states that have lecogmzed some foim of apportionment to modify the application of the 
last injurious exposure rule See Laison, Larson 's Workei 's Compensation D153-81 to 87 (2004) 
12
 Larson, § 153 02[5] at 153-10. 
b
 When the disease becomes known and disabling See Utah Code Ann § 34A-3-108(2)(b) 
14
 See Utah Code Ann § 34A-3-105(1) As noted above, subsection (2) does not apply to this case 
6 
sequential industrial accidents and the single cause of action that arises from 
injurious exposures spanning the coverage periods of multiple insurers and/or 
employers. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, WCF respectfully asks the Court of Appeals to 
uphold the Utah Labor Commission's order requiring Bryner Clinic and/or IHC 
Risk Management to be solely responsible for the permanent partial disability 
compensation and medical benefits attributable to Ms. Wood's occupational 
disease. WCF does agree with BC/IHC that the Commission's impairment rating 
calculations should be corrected to conform to the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-3-110. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2005. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
&U /<.'^ 
Elliot K. Morris 
Attorney for Respondent Workers 
Compensation Fund 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Labor Commission: 
• Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, June 21, 2004 
• Order on Motion for Review, February 
14,2005 
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Workers Cf^D^smv^«- -
Leg*/ Departnen* 
KAREN S WOOD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IHC BRYNER CLINIC, IHC RISK 
MANAGEMENT, WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondent 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 20011138 
Judge Sharon J Eblen 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner filed an application for hearing on November 2, 2001 seeking the 
payment of occupational disease benefits for latex allergy as a result of exposure to 
latex in the course and scope of her employment with IHC Bryner Clinic for the period 
from September 1992 to December 1997. A hearing was scheduled for October 18, 
2002, but on October 17, 2002, the parties requested that they be allowed to submit 
stipulated facts for a direct medical panel referral. Accordingly, on the request of the 
parties, the hearing in this matter was canceled. 
The parties submitted a Fact Stipulation for a direct medical panel referral on 
December 11, 2002. However, the fact stipulation failed to detail the petitioner specific 
job duties and the manner in which she was exposed latex in her employment and 
private life. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted the additional information requested 
by the administrative law judge on March 26, 2003. On May 19, 2003, respondent 
submitted a letter agreeing to the exposure information submitted by the petitioner in 
March 26, 2003, but added additional information about the petitioner's use of latex and 
non latex gloves in her employment with respondents. On July 22, 2003, the petitioner 
notified the commission that she did not object to the additional information provided in 
Respondents letter dated May 16, 2003. 
The administrative law judge prepared supplemental facts based upon the 
information provided by the parties on September 10, 2003. This matter was forwarded 
to a medical panel appointed by the Labor Commission on September 10, 2003. On 
January 20, 2004, the medical panel report was received by the commission and 
forwarded to the parties on January 20, 2004. Petitioner filed an objection to the 
medical panel report that was received by the commission on February 9, 2004. 
Wood v. Bryner Clinic 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order 
Page 2 of 2 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. Petitioner was born on November 12, 1962. Her social security number is 004-74-
9550. At the time of the alleged occupational disease, the claimant was married and 
had four children under the age of 18. 
2. Petitioner was hired to work for the Bryner Clinic on September 1 1992, as a medical 
lab technician. Petitioner's shifts regularly lasted eight hours per day, working 
approximately five days each week. At the time of the alleged occupational disease, 
she was earning wages of approximately $428.40 per week. She was married and had 
four dependent children. 
3. On about October 31, 2001, petitioner filed an occupational disease claim, alleging 
that she sustained a latex allergy as a result of the exposure to latex in the course of per 
employment with the Bryner Clinic from the period of September 1992 through 
December 1997. 
4. From January 1 1991 through January 16,1995, the Bryner clinic was insured by the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah. 
5. Since January 16, 1995, Bryner Clinic has been self insured with claims managed by 
IHC Risk Management. 
6. The Employers First Report of Injury states that petitioner sustained an injury or 
illness on September 2,1997 at approximately 12:45 p.m. when she had an allergic 
reaction when inhaling latex allergens. The Employers First Report of Injury also states 
that she notified Bryner Clinic of her latex allergy on May 20, 1997. 
7. Petitioner smoked for made 17 (1979) through 1982. She smoked again from 1992 
to 1997. She smoked again from 1998 to 1999. She began smoking again in 2001, but 
is no longer smoking. She has never smoked more than half a pack daily. 
8. The course of medical treatment and petitioner's medical history are contained in the 
medical records. The 62 page medical records exhibit prepared IHC Risk Management 
(referred herein as " IHC's M R E "), and the 339 page medical records exhibit prepared 
by the Workers1 Compensation Fund (referred herein as " WCF's M R E "), should be 
admitted into evidence. There is some duplication between the medical records. 
9. In accordance with the recent request of the Labor Commission for chronological 
summary as of medical records, attached as Exhibit A is a chronological summary of 
the medical records submitted by Mr. Chai Citations to records (column labeled " PG ") 
contained in the IHC M R E are included in the summary. Records without a page 
number referred to records found only in the WCF's M R E. The parties do not stipulate 
that this chronological summary is evidence in this case. Rather it is submitted so that 
the administrative law judge is able to better locate the medical records and place them 
in some chronological context. 
Wood v. Bryner Clinic 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order 
Page 3 of 3 
10. Petitioner seeks the following benefits: 
a. She is entitled to a 44% permanent partial impairment rating for her respiratory 
system and skin caused by or are (sic) directly related to her exposure to latex at the 
Bryner Clinic from September 1992 through December 1997. 
b. On going medical care for her respiratory system and skin caused by or are 
(SIC) directly related to her exposure to latex at the Bryner Clinic from September 1992 
through December 1997. 
Petitioner does not claim benefits for any unpaid temporary disability benefits. Nor does 
she claim that any prior medical expenses related to her claims remain unpaid. 
11. Respondents denies (sic) that they are liable for any permanent partial impairment 
rating. Respondents also denied that they remains (sic) responsible for ongoing 
medical care. 
12. The parties agree that the medical evidence is controverted thus requiring a direct 
medical panel referral on the medical issues in this case. 
13. The parties waive their rights to an evidentiary hearing (but not any medical panel 
hearing). 
14. In medical panel should determine: 
a. What permanent impairment, if any, petitioner has for her latex exposure 
while working for Bryner Clinic? Any permanent partial impairment fish identified 
specifically and apportion as appropriate to contributing factors unrelated to her work for 
Bryner Clinic, her work at Bryner Clinic from September 1992 to January 16,1995 
(during coverage of WCF's) and; her work at Bryner Clinic from January 16, 1995 
through December 1997 (during coverage under IHC Risk Management). 
b. if your medical care, if any, petitioner requires for her latex exposure while 
working for Bryner Clinic? Any future medical care should be identified specifically and 
apportioned as appropriate to contributing factors unrelated to her work for Bryner 
Clinic, her work at Bryner clinic from September 1992 to January 16, 1995 (during 
coverage of WCF) and; her work at Bryner Clinic from January 16, 1995 through 
December 1997 (during coverage under a IHC Risk Management). 
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
15. The parties submitted stipulated facts on December 11, 2002. On February 18, 
2003, the administrative law judge requested that the parties provide additional 
information describing the petitioner's job duties, including how she was exposed latex 
in her employment and any exposures outside the employment. The parties submitted 
the supplemental information in letter form and all parties either specifically agreed that 
the additional information was correct or provided no response contesting the additional 
information. Accordingly, the administrative law judge sets forth herein the additional 
facts 15 through 22, provided by the parties in this matter: 
Wood v. Bryner Clinic 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order 
Page 4 of 4 
16. While Karen Wood was employed with the Bryner Clinic from September 1992 to 
December 1997, she consistently worked in four separate areas of the clinic. For each 
we have provided a basic description of her job duties and the exposure to latex that 
occurred while performing that job. 
17. a. Upstairs Laboratory: Ms. Wood was required to draw blood from patients and 
the basic testing such as urinalysis, hematocrits and blood sugars. She usually work 
between 16 to 24 hours a week in the upstairs lab and would go through between 20 
and 40 pair of latex gloves per day. She was exposed latex by both wearing, taking on 
and taking off her gloves, as well as being exposed to the latex from other individuals 
doing the same sort of tasks and there were usually two to four people working in the 
upstairs lab. 
b. Hematology: Ms. Wood processed blood for CBC's, sedimentary testing 
requiring pipetting and red blood smears. Ms. Wood wore between eight to 25 pair of 
gloves a day in this department and spent between 8 and 16 hours a week in 
hematology. There were usually four to seven people working in the downstairs labs 
which included hematology, chemistry and the special chemistry area. 
c. Chemistry. Ms. Wood processed blood for routine chemistry panels. She 
used between two to weight pair of gloves a day in this area and spent about eight 
hours per week performing such tasks. 
d. Special Chemistry Area: Ms. Wood processed many different chemistry tests 
quite relation studies, and and in studies and was required to wear gloves while she 
was performing such tests. As her hours in this area ranged from 0 to 8 a week, the 
number of gloves that she would be required to wear would vary. 
18. Ms. Wood's exposure to latex was by both wearing the gloves herself and by having 
the latex particulates in the air when she would put on or remove a pair of gloves. She 
was also in close proximity to between two and seven other co-workers who were also 
performing the same types of tasks and putting latex particulates in the air by putting on 
and taking off gloves in the same work area. 
19. Ms. Wood's latex exposure outside of work was the same as any other average 
person and was not exposed to any significant latex presence outside of work. 
20. Ms. Wood used latex gloves with cornstarch powder until September 1997. 
21. Ms. Wood began using non latex gloves in September 1997. 
22. The clinic stopped using cornstarch powdered latex gloves near the end of 1997. 
23. The petitionees application for hearing indicates that she worked for first medical 
care in Union City, Georgia from April 1985 to August 1991. The application for hearing 
indicates that the petitioner worked for clinical laboratories in Cheyenne, Wyoming from 
August 1991 to August 1992. The application for hearing indicates that the petitioner 
worked for I H C Bryner Clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah from September 1992 to 
Wood v. Bryner Clinic 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order 
Page 5 of 5 
December 1997. To the application for hearing indicates that the petitioner worked for 
Cheyenne radiology in Cheyenne Wyoming from April 1998 to August 2001. 
24. The petitioner's average weekly wage was $428.40. This translates to a weekly 
compensation rate of $285.61. She was married with four dependent children under the 
age of 18, which adds $25 per week to the compensation rate for a total of $311 per 
week rounded to the nearest dollar. However, the maximum compensation rate for 
permanent partial disability compensation in December 1997 was $310 per week. 
25. The petitioner was medically stable or at maximum medical improvement on 
February 27, 1998 . 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Utah applies the last injurious exposure rule to insurance carriers. Pacific 
Employers Insurance Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 157 P. 2 d 800 (Utah 1945); 
Ballatore vs. Buehner Block et a / . ,LC Case No. 02-0124, 5/18/04. 
Utah Code Section 34 A-3-110 provides: 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and 
limited to the proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the 
occupational disease were the sole cause of disability or death, as the 
occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the causes of 
disability or death when the occupational disease, or any part of the 
disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not 
subject to commission jurisdiction; 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial 
exposure outside of employment or to which the general public is 
commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; 
or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an 
occupational disease. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties submitted stipulated facts for direct medical panel referral regarding 
the extent of the petitioner's permanent partial impairment and the relative causal 
contributions of occupational and non-occupational factors to her latex allergy. The 
medical panel appointed a medical panel to review the medical aspects of this case. 
Although the parties failed to include specific information about the petitioner's 
exposures to latex in employment prior to her employment with Bryner Clinic, the 
medical panel took a medical and occupational history from the petitioner as part of the 
medical panel's evaluation of this case. The medical panel noted that the petitioner 
Wood v. Bryner Clinic 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order 
Page 6 of 6 
began working in the medical field on the military in 1981. She worked for Med First 
Humana Primecare as a laboratory and X-ray technician from 1983 to 1989 on in 
Georgia; and from 1990 to 1991 in Cheyenne, Wyoming as a laboratory worker. 
Accordingly, the medical panel noted that the petitioner was exposed to latex for 5 of 
her 15 occupational latex exposure years in Utah. 
Utah's Occupational Disease Act, Section 34A-3-110, provides for apportionment 
of benefits based upon the relative occupational and non-occupational causal 
contributions. Under Pacific Employers, the last insurance carrier during the 
employment that was the last injurious exposure is responsible pay all compensation 
and medical expenses attributable to the compensable occupational exposure under the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. However, the act provides that the Utah employer is 
only responsible to pay compensation that is causally related to the Utah employment. 
The evidence in the record shows of the petitioner worked five years in Utah in 
employment that causally contributed to the onset of her latex allergy symptoms. 
Accordingly, the Utah employer, Bryner Clinic is responsible to pay one-third of the 
occupationally-related condition. The medical panel opined that the petitioner's 
pulmonary condition was 70 percent related to her employment and 30% related to non-
industrial allergies, including exposures to latex outside of employment, and her genetic 
predisposition to allergy. The medical panel noted that the petitioner is allergic to some 
environmental allergens as well as some foods in addition to her allergy to latex. 
The medical panel concluded that the petitioner has 11% permanent partial 
impairment attributable to her pulmonary and skin conditions. The medical panel 
attributed 70 percent of this impairment to the petitioner's latex allergy, yielding an 8% 
whole person permanent partial impairment due to latex allergy. The panel went on to 
apportion 90 percent of the petitioner's latex allergy to her industrial exposures and 10% 
to non-occupational factors. This yields a permanent partial impairment of 7.2% whole 
person attributable to the petitioner's industrial latex allergy. 
The medical panel then proceeded to apportion causation for the petitioner's five 
years of Utah employment latex exposures from her 15 year overall employment 
exposure to latex. The petitioner's Utah employment contributed one-third of the 
petitioner's total occupational exposure to latex. Thus, the petitioner's Utah employment 
exposures to latex contributed a 2.4% permanent impairment (7.2 x 33.3% = 2.397% ). 
Under Pacific Employers, the responsibility for the entire Utah employment related 
permanent partial impairment lies with IHC Risk Management, the last insurance carrier 
during petitioner's harmful exposure. 
The medical panel calculated the percentage of Bryner Clinic's share of future 
medical expenses for the industrial contribution to petitioner's latex allergy. However, 
under Pacific Employers, the responsibility for payment for the causal contribution of 
petitioner's Utah employment to her future medical care lies with the last insurance 
carrier, IHC Risk Management. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner's Utah employment contributed one-third to the petitioner's 
permanent partial impairment and future medical care for her occupational^ caused 
latex allergy. The responsibility to pay the contribution for petitioner's Utah 
employment-related occupational disease lies with the last insurance carrier for Bryner 
Clinic during petitioner's injurious exposure, IHC Risk Management. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Bryner Clinic and IHC Risk Management 
shall pay the petitioner, Karen S. Wood, permanent partial disability compensation for a 
2.4% permanent impairment or 7.49 weeks at the rate of $310 per week for a total of 
$2,321.90, plus interest at 8 percent per annum from February 28, 1998. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bryner Clinic and I. H. C. Risk Management 
shall pay one-third of the medical expenses necessary to treat petitioner's industrial 
latex allergy in accordance with the relative value schedule of the Labor Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bryner Clinic and IHC Risk Management shall 
pay James E. Seaman, Attorney at Law an attorney's fee in the amount of $464.38, plus 
20 percent of the interest generated on the above award, for his services to the 
petitioner in this matter. Said attorneys' fees shall be deducted from the above award 
and remitted directly to the office of James E Seaman, Attorney at Law. 
DATED THIS A | day of ^\lAyuJi 2004. 
UTAH LABOR COMM 
^U^yn /t CAfxJsl^ 
Sharon J Eblen 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the 
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set 
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 
days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their 
responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission 
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for 
Review or its response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals 
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on June 21, 2004, to the persons/parties at the 
following addresses: 
Karen S Wood 
Box 313 
Hancock ME 04640 
Die Bryner Clinic 
745 E 300 S 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Richard C Henriksen Jr, Esq 
320 S 500 E 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Kristy Bertelsen Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Mark Dean Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Elliot K Morris Esq 
P O Box 57929 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Nancy E Boling. 
Adjudication Division 
FEB 1 5 2005 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Worktrs Compensation Fund 
I U p i Department 
ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR REVIEW 
Claim No.: _JVOO \ ~ 6 ^ Z\°[ 
Case No. 01-1138 — — 
Scan Into Legal 
IHC asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Eblen's award of 
benefits to Karen S. Wood under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 
3, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Ms. Wood filed an application for hearing on November 2, 2001, to compel IHC to pay 
occupational disease benefits for latex allergy caused by her employment at IHC. Ms. Wood and 
IHC waived their right to a hearing, submitted stipulated facts, and agreed that a medical panel 
should consider the medical aspects of Ms. Wood's claim. The medical panel submitted its report on 
January 20, 2004. In a decision issued June 21, 2004, Judge Eblen accepted the medical panel's 
report, held IHC liable for a part of Ms. Wood's latex allergy and awarded benefits accordingly. IHC 
then requested Commission review of Judge Eblen's decision on the grounds that the decision 
incorrectly applied various provisions of the Act in computing IHC's liability. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As relevant to the issues raised in IHC's motion for review, the Commission makes the 
following findings of fact, based on the parties' stipulated facts and the medical panel's report. The 
Commission also adopts Judge Eblen's findings of fact to the extent they are consistent with this 
decision. 
Ms. Wood suffers from an 11% whole person impairment. Of this 11% impairment, 8% is 
from work-related latex allergies. The remainder is from Ms. Wood's underlying asthmatic/allergic 
condition which is not work-related. Ms. Wood has limited her occupational disease claim to 
disability and medical expenses for her latex allergy. 
Ms. Wood's work-related latex allergy arose during a 15 year period when Ms. Wood was 
injuriously exposed to latex products while employed at various health care facilities. This 
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employment included clinics in Georgia and Wyoming and ended with her employment by IHC 
from September 1992 until December 1997. In addition to her work-related exposure to latex, Ms. 
Wood also experienced some exposure from her non-work environment. 
Prior to January 16,1995, IHC was insured for occupational disease liability by the Workers 
Compensation Fund. After that date, IHC was self-insured. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Because IHC contends that Judge Eblen erred in application of the Occupational Disease 
Act's provisions for assessing and computing liability in this matter, the Comnriission will apply the 
relevant provisions of the Occupational Disease Act on a step-by-step basis. 
Section 34A-3-103 of the Occupational Disease Act defines "compensable occupational 
disease" as "any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of employment and is medically 
caused or aggravated by that employment." The undisputed facts establish that Ms. Wood's 
employment brought her into contact with latex and that this exposure medically caused or 
aggravated her latex allergy. Ms. Wood's latex allergy is, therefore, a compensable occupational 
disease. 
Section 34A-3-110 of the Act1 establishes an apportionment formula that must be applied to 
Section 34A-3-110, "Occupational Disease Aggravated By Other Diseases" provides as 
follows: 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease 
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease, 
or any part of the disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to 
commission jurisdiction; 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure 
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
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occupational disease claims when any one of four criteria set out as §34A-3-l 10(1) through (4) is 
met. The Commission notes that §34A-3-l 10 is poorly drafted and difficult to apply. Nevertheless, 
Ms. Wood's claim meets subsections (1) and (2), in that her latex allergy is causally related to 
employment with non-Utah employers and is causally related to non-work exposures to latex. 
Therefore, under the operative provisions of §34A-3-l 10, Ms. Wood's compensation must be limited 
to the proportion that "the occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the causes of the 
disability.. . ." 
In applying this formula, it is important to note that Ms. Wood's claim is limited to her latex 
allergy. By the same token, it is only Ms. Wood's latex allergy which is the "occupational disease" 
under consideration. Therefore, applying the statutory language of § 110 to the circumstances of this 
case, the Commission concludes that Ms. Wood's occupational disease (latex allergy) is the entire 
cause of the disability at issue. Consequently, §34A-3-l 10 imposes no reduction to Ms. Wood's 
occupational disease benefits for her latex allergy and she is entitled to permanent partial disability 
compensation for the entire 8% latex allergy impairment, as well as medical expenses necessary to 
treat that allergy. 
Having concluded that Ms. Wood is entitled to medical benefits and disability compensation 
based on an 8% impairment, the Commission now turns to the question of whether IHC is liable for 
the full amount of those benefits. That question is controlled by §34A-3-105 of the Occupational 
Disease Act: 
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational 
disease which arises out of and in the course of an employee's employment for more 
than one employer, the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose 
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease 
if: 
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that employer was 
a substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and 
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 consecutive 
months. 
(2) Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for disability, 
death, and medical benefits shall be apportioned between employers 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational 
disease. 
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Applying the foregoing statute to the facts of this case, Ms. Wood's latex allergy arose during 
her employment in several health care facilities over a period of 15 years. The last of these facilities 
was IHC, where she worked for approximately 5 years. Her employment at IHC, with the exposure 
to latex that went with it, was a substantial contributing cause of her latex allergy. Consequently, 
under the provisions of §105, IHC, as a self-insured entity, is liable for the entire amount of Ms. 
Wood's compensation and medical care. 
ORDER 
In light of the. foregoing, the Commission modifies Judge Eblen's Order as follows: 
Commencing February 28, 1998, IHC shall pay to Karen S. Wood permanent partial 
disability compensation at the rate of $310 per week for 25 weeks, based upon Ms. Wood's 8% 
whole person impairment from latex allergy. IHC shall also pay Ms. Wood interest at 8% per annum 
on any of the foregoing disability payments that were not paid when due. 
IHC shall also pay the reasonable expense of medical care necessary to treat Ms. Wood's 
latex allergy, in accordance with the Labor Commission's medical fee schedule. 
From the total amount of disability compensation and interest due Ms. Wood, IHC shall 
withhold 20% and pay that amount directly to James E. Seaman as his fee for serving as Ms. Wood's 
attorney in this matter. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this JT day of February, 2005. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
id&ensL 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Karen S Wood, Case No. 20011138, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ]Y_ day of February, 
2005, to the following: 
KAREN S WOOD 
BOX 313 
HANCOCK ME 04640 
IHC BRYNER CLINIC 
745 E 300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
RICHARD C HENRIKSEN JR, ESQ 
320 S 500 E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
MARK D. DEAN ESQ 
257 E 200 S STE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
ELLIOT K MORRIS ESQ 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE 
CHAPTER 3. UTAH OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
§ 34A-3-105. Last employer liable—Exception 
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational disease which arises 
out of and in the course of an employee's employment for more than one employer, the only employer liable 
shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the 
disease if: 
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that employer was a 
substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and 
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 consecutive months. 
(2) Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for disability, death, and medical 
benefits shall be apportioned between employers based on the involved employers' causal contribution to the 
occupational disease. 
Laws 1991, c. 136, § 18; Laws 1996, c. 240, § J95, eff. July 1, J997; Laws 1997, c. 375, § 153, eff July 1, 1997. 
Codifications C 1953, §§35-2-105, 35A-3a-105. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
REFERENCES 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Workers' Compensation ^ ^ 2 0 1 , 551. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 413k201; 413k551. 
C.J.S. Workers' Compensation §§ 120, 125 to 127, 322 to 323. 
ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Computation of period of limitations 4 
Construction and application 1 
Length of employment or exposure 2 
Successive insurers 3 
*19220 Sufficiency of evidence 5 
1. Construction and application 
Occupational Disease and Disability Act does not implicitly grant Industrial Commission discretion to interpret 1988 Last 
Injurious Exposure Rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-2-1 et seq., 35-2-14. Luckau v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 1992, 840 
P.2d 811, certiorari denied 853 P.2d 897. Statutes <2X=>219(9.1) 
© 2005 Th6mson/West. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
UT ST Sec 34A-3-105, Last employer liable-Exception Page 2 
Amendment to Occupational Disease Disability Act, providing that exposure to hazardous substance must be substantial 
contributing medical cause of disease and that employee must have been employed at least 12 consecutive months by employer in 
order to be compensated, was not merely explanatory clanfymg amendment, but rather substantively changed Last Injunous 
Exposure Rule U C A 1953, 35-2-14, 35-2-105 Luckau v Board of Review of Indus Com'n of Utah, 1992, 840 P 2d 811, 
certioian denied 853 P 2d 897 Workers' Compensation <§^73 
2. Length of employment or exposure 
Pnoi veision of Last Injurious Exposure Rule encompasses all situations in which employee is exposed to material or 
substances which contribute to illness from which employee suffers or which caused employee's death, in amount sufficient to have 
caused or contnbuted to any degree to that condition, any exposuie which did contribute or could have contributed to condition is 
sufficient U C A 1953, 35-2-13(b), 35-2-14 Luckau v Board of Review of Indus Com'n of Utah, 1992, 840 P 2d 811, certiorari 
denied 853 P 2d 897 Woikers' Compensation <2^201 
Statute limiting liability for silicosis to employer in whose employment employee was last exposed to hdimful quantities of dust 
during period of 30 days requires only employment throughout 30-day period with harmful exposure during period, but does not 
require actual woiking or actual exposure each day of period U C A 1953, 35-2-14 State Ins Fund v Industrial Commission, 
1964, 16 Utah 2d 50, 395 P 2d 541 Workers' Compensation <£=>201 
*19221 3. Successive insurers 
Where miner's employer was self-insured during miner's employment and exposure to silicon dioxide until December, 1961, 
when Insurance Fund took over, and miner who had been laid off in June, 1961, was recalled by same employer for seven days until 
February 8, 1962, during which he was subject to same exposure, the employer and hence the Insurance Fund were liable under 
statute pioviding that only employer liable should be employer m whose employment employee was last exposed during period of 
30 days or moie U C A 1953, 35-2-14 State Ins Fund v Industrial Commission, 1965, 16 Utah 2d 269, 399 P 2d 208 Workers' 
Compensation <§^=>1074 
Under Occupational Disease Act providing that in case of silicosis only employer liable shall be the employer in whose 
employment employee was last exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, the insurance carrier at time of employee's last 
exposure to silicon dioxide dust was required to pay the compensation award, notwithstanding such carrier was no longer carrier at 
time of employee's disability from sihco-tuberculosis Utah Code 1943, 42-la-l et seq , 42-la-12, 42-la-29, 42-la-13(a) (3), 
42-1 a-14, 42-la-49(a) Pacific Emp Ins Co v Industrial Commission of Utah, 1945, 108 Utah 123, 157 P 2d 800 Workers' 
Compensation c§^=>1074 
4. Computation of period of limitations 
Widow of insulation mechanic who died more than three years fiom last date on which he actually woiked for employer with 
whom he was injuriously exposed to asbestos was not entitled to death benefits under Occupational Disease Disability Law 
U C A 1953, 35-2-13, 35-2-13(b)(4), 35-2-14 Tisco Intermountain v Industrial Com'n of Utah, 1987, 744 P 2d 1340 Woikeis' 
Compensation ^^^ 1280 
5. Sufficiency of evidence 
* 19222 Evidence in proceeding for compensation for silicosis and tuberculosis supported findings that claimant had been 
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust in state for five of last fifteen years piecedmg disablement, had been exposed to 
haimful quantities of dust after State Insurance Fund policy became effective, and had been exposed to haimful quantities for thirty 
separate days during month when policy was effective U C A 1953, 35-2-1 et seq , 35-2-13(a)(3) State Ins Fund v Industrial 
Commission, 1964, 16 Utah 2d 50, 395 P 2d 541 Woikers' Compensation <£^1509 
In proceedings by underground miner under the Occupational Disease Statute to recover compensation for silicosis, evidence 
sustained finding of Industrial Commission that miner was injuriously exposed to silicon dioxide dust for statutory period while 
working foi mining company U C A 1943, 42-la-14 Commission of Finance v Industrial Commission, 1952, 121 Utah 83, 239 
P 2d 185 Workers'Compensation <S^ 1509 
Evidence suppoited findings that claimant was exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust for period of five years 
between September, 1935, and July, 1946, that exposure occuned while employed by objecting employer, and that claimant left 
employment in 1946 in consequence of total disability from silicosis, so as to justify award under the occupational disease disability 
compensation law U C A 1943, 42-la-13a(3), 42-la-14 Kennecott Copper Corp, Utah Copper Division v Industrial 
Commission, 1949, 115 Utah 451, 205 P 2d 829 Woikers' Compensation <§^>1530 
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UT ST Sec. 34A-3-105, Last employer liable-Exception Page 3 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE 
CHAPTER 3. UTAH OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT 
Current through Nov 2, 2004 general election 
§ 34A-3-110. Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the proportion of the 
compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of disability or death, as 
the occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the 
occupational disease, or any part of the disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to commission jurisdiction; 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure outside of employment 
or to which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, 
accelerated, or m any way contributed to by an occupational disease. 
Laws 1991, c 136, § 22, Laws 1996, c 240, § 200, eff July 1, 1997, Laws 1997, c 375, § 158, eff July 1 1997 
Codifications C 1953, §§ 35 2-109, 35A-3a-110 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
REFERENCES 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Workers' Compensation <§^>547, 552 to 566, 845 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 413k547, 413k552 to 413k566, 413k845 
C J S Workers* Compensation §§ 315 to 316, 320 to 321, 324 to 337, 549 to 551 
Current through Nov 2, 2004 general election 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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*800 157 P 2d 800 
108 Utah 123 
Supreme Court of Utah 
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INS. CO. et al. 
v 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al. 
No 6768 
April 17, 1945 
Original proceeding m certiorari by the Pacific 
Employeis Insmance Company and the National 
Tunnel & Mines Company to review an award of 
compensation to John Deza by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, wherein the State Insurance Fund 
was made a defendant 
Award against the National Tunnel & Mines 
Company, employer, affirmed, and award against 
Pacific Employers Insurance Company annulled 
West Headnotes 
Workers' Compensation G^ 1074 
413 — 
413X1 Insmance and Public Funds 
413XI(D) Private Insurance 
413k 1074 Successive Insureis 
Under Occupational Disease Act providing that in 
case of silicosis only employer liable shall be the 
employei in whose employment employee was last 
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, 
the insurance carriei at time of employee's last 
exposure to silicon dioxide dust was required to pay 
the compensation awaid, notwithstanding such carrier 
was no longer carriei at time of employee's disability 
from silico-tuberculosis Utah Code 1943, 42-la-l et 
seq, 42-la-12, 42-la-29, 42-1 a-13(a) (3), 42-1 a-14, 
42-la-49(a) 
*801 Charles Welch, Jr, of Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs 
Giover A Giles, Atty Gen, and F A Tiottier, of 
Salt Lake City, foi defendants 
TURNER, Justice 
Certioran to the Industiial Commission to review 
an award of compensation to John Deza who became 
totally disabled to woik on March 25, 1944, aftei 
conti acting silico-tubeiculosis, withm the meaning of 
the Occupational Disease Disability Compensation Act 
(Sec 42-la-l et seq, UCA1943), which act took 
effect July 1, 1941 The facts, [108 Utah 124] 
established without dispute m the lecoid, are that Deza 
for 27 1/2 yeais during the period fiom 1914 to Maich, 
1944, was employed by the National Tunnel & Mines 
Company and its predecessor m interest, Utah-Apex 
Mining Company Continuous employment by the 
mining companies named as an actual underground 
miner up to June 7, 1943, was interrupted by 
approximately 2 1/2 years' employment from 1920 to 
1923 by the Paik-Utah Mines at Park City, Utah, and 
the Utah Copper Mining Company at Bingham Utah 
Testimony of Dr Paul S Richards, one of the 
applicant's several attending physicians, shows that the 
first record on the applicant dates back to 1932, that 
the first positive diagnosis of silicosis was made March 
10, 1937, on clinical findings, and the first positive X-
ray findings weie made December 28, 1939, resulting 
m a diagnosis of silico-tuberculosis Applicant's 
piogressive condition, shown by these diagnoses, did 
not result in actual disability to perform his work, 
except an occasional lay-off on account of sickness 
On advice from the doctor, however, Deza left 
underground mining on June 7, 1943, and remained m 
the Company's employ as a watchman above the 
giound from then until March 25, 1944, on which date 
he definitely ceased working and was later confined as 
a continued bed patient in the hospital On April 20, 
1944, stereoscopic X-rays were again taken when a 
confirmed diagnosis of silico-tuberculosis was made 
and fiom an X-ray standpoint the tubeiculosis was 
considered as active The first positive sputum was 
found on May 19, 1944 
Fiom the foregoing statement of facts, it is seen that 
the last actual exposure to silicon dioxide dust was 
June 7, 1943 The significant importance of this date 
will become appaient immediately Prior to July 1, 
1943, the workmen's compensation and occupational 
disease insurance was carried by the National Tunnel 
& Mines Company with the State Insmance Fund On 
and aftei July 1, 1943, the Mines Company insurance 
earner was the Pacific Employers Insmance [108 Utah 
125] Company for liability undei both acts, and by 
Provision VII of its policy of insmance it was piovided 
that This agieement shall apply only to such injuries so 
sustained by reason of accidents occurring during the 
Policy Penod limited and defined as such m Item 2 of 
said Declaiations' Item 2 of the Declaration sets out 
that the policy penod 'shall be fiom July 1, 1943, to 
July 1, 1944' 
We here quote a few pertinent provisions of the 
state (UC A 1943) 
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Sec 42-la-29 
Silicosis-Defmed Toi the purpose of this act 
'silicosis' is defined as a chronic disease of the lungs 
caused by the piolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide 
dust (SiO sub2 ) chaiactenzed by small disciete 
nodules of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated 
throughout both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray 
pettem, and by variable clinical manifestations ' 
Sec 42-la-12 
'The following terms as used m this act shall be 
construed as follows 
'(a) 'Disablement' means the event of becoming 
physically incapacitated by reason of an occupational 
disease as defined m this act from performing any work 
foi remuneiation or profit Silicosis, as defined in this 
act, when complicated by active pulmonary 
tube? culosis, shall be presumed to be total disablement 
'Disability,' 'disabled,' 'total disability' or 'totally 
disabled' shall be synonymous with 'disablement" 
Sec 42-la-14 
'Where compensation is payable for an 
occupational disease the only employer liable shall be 
the employer m whose employment the employee was 
last mjuiiously exposed to the hazards of such disease, 
pi ovided that in the case of silicosis the only employer 
liable shall be the employei in whose employment the 
employee was last exposed to haimful quantities of 
silicon dioxide (SiO sub2 ) dust dining a penod of 
*802 sixty days oi more aftei the effective date of this 
act' 
Sec 42-la-13 
'(a) There is imposed upon every employer a 
liability foi the payment of compensation to every 
employee who becomes totally disabled[108 Utah 126] 
by reason of an occupational disease subject to the 
following conditions * * * 
'(3) No compensation shall be paid in case of 
silicosis unless during the ten years immediately 
preceding the disablement the injured employee shall 
have been exposed to harmful quantities of silicon 
dioxide (SiO sub2 ) dust for a total period of not less 
than five years m this state and unless total disability 
results withm two years from the last day upon which 
the employee actually worked for the employer-agamst 
when compensation is claimed ' 
© 2005 Thomson/West No 
Sec 42-la-49 
'The right to compensation under this act foi 
disability oi death from an occupational disease shall 
be forever barred unless written claim is filed with the 
commission withm the time as m this section 
hereinafter provided 
'(a) If the claim is made by an employee and based 
upon silicosis it must be filed withm one year after the 
cause of action arises * * *' 
On May 22, 1944, Deza filed application with the 
Commission setting forth the nature of his total 
disability and its cause as hereinbefore stated Upon 
this application and the answer of the Pacific 
Employers Insuiance Company denying liability, and 
after the State Insurance Fund was made a party to the 
proceeding, the case was duly heard before the 
Commission and a decision was made and filed July 
11, 1944 In its decision, the Commission found the 
facts to be substantially as set out at the beginning of 
this opimon, and held the National Tunnel & Mines 
Company and the Pacific Employers Insuiance 
Company liable for the statutory compensation, 
hospital and medical expense, and dismissed the 
application as against the State Insurance Fund 
In the course of its decision, the Commission holds 
'We cannot give any weight to the argument of 
defendant, Pacific Employers Insurance Company that 
applicant was not exposed to haraiful quantities of free 
silicon dioxide dust since July 1, 1943, the date when 
Pacific Employeis Insurance Company became the 
insurance carrier We think the lecord shows 
conclusively that applicant! 108 Utah 127] was 
exposed to hamrful quantities of fiee silicon dioxide 
dust for not less than five years out of the last ten years 
immediately preceding his disablement, and that he 
was likewise exposed for more than sixty days since 
the effective date of the act, July 1, 1941 If this is 
true, then legardless of the fact that the disability 
occuned after Pacific Employers Insuiance Company 
became the insurance carrier, the same employer is 
involved thioughout the entue period fiom 1934 to 
March 25, 1944, and theiefoie the question of 
insuiance camei is nnmateiial The National Tunnel 
and Mines Company was the first and last employer so 
far as we are concerned, and since the claim of 
applicant was filed will withm the time specified by the 
statute of limitations the employei is unquestionably 
liable, and the insurance carrier which happens to be 
the msuier at the time the total disability occurs must 
assume liability, although the exposme occuned prior 
to the effective date of the policy, and although the 
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disease which finally caused total disablement existed 
pnoi to the date of the said policy' (Italics added ) 
The Commission's findings and award of 
compensation m favor of Deza against the National 
Tunnel & Mines Company as employer are amply 
supported by the recoid and there can be no dispute as 
to this portion of the Commission's decision The 
questions raised with merit m this court on review 
i elate solely to whether the Pacific Employers 
Insurance Company or the State Insurance Fund is 
liable as insurance carriei under the peculiar facts of 
this case 
It is our opinion that the Commission erred m 
holding the Pacific Employers Insurance Company 
liable It is true that the applicant's total disability did 
not occur until Maich 25, 1944, but the cause of his 
ultimate disability had been m operation for many 
years prior to that date The statute plainly piovides 
'that m the case of silicosis the only employer liable 
shall be the employei m whose employment the 
employee was last exposed to haimful quantities of 
silicon dioxide (SiQ sub2 ) dust during a period of sixty 
days or more after the effective date of this act [July 1, 
1941]' Under the facts, the statutory requnements 
*803 weie all clearly met and render the National 
Tunnel & Mines Company [108 Utah 128] liable as 
such last employer As has been pointed out, however, 
June 7, 1943, was the date of the last exposure of the 
applicant to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, 
and from that date until his employment ceased 
because of total disability on March 25, 1944, he 
continued in the employ of the Mines Company but m 
the capacity of a watchman above ground on the 
property of the Company The insurance carrier at the 
time of such last exposure was the State Insurance 
Fund, this is the date which fixes the liability of the 
employer, and consequently also attaches the liability 
to the employer's msuiance earner as of that date, and 
upon the whole lecord and from the clear wording of 
the statute, the decision of the Commission should have 
held the State Insmance Fund liable for the payment of 
the compensation awarded 
Many cases aie cited by both parties, none directly 
m point but many helpful m pimciple, and we deem it 
only necessary m support of our decision to quote the 
following fiom Case of Anderson, 288 Mass 96, 192 
N E 520, 521, cited m plaintiffs bnef The fact that 
the employee continued to work for a short time after 
the cause of his incapacity became complete did not as 
matter of law lequire a finding that his mjmy did not 
occm until, because of incapacity, he ceased woikmg 
Personal injury and incapacity for work aie not 
equivalent terms and incapacity foi work which is the 
final result of injury does not necessarily begin when 
the injury occurs Case of Can oil, 225 Mass 203, 207, 
114 N E 285 Cases m which it has been held that the 
boaid was warranted m taking the date incapacity 
began as the date of the injury aie cases where there 
was no finding of the exact date of the injury 
(Atamian's Case, 295 Mass 12, 16, 163 N E 194) or 
where there was evidence that the cause of the injury 
was cumulative, as here, and, furthermore, that the 
employment continued to be a contributing cause of 
such injury up to the date incapacity began See In re 
Johnson, 217 Mass 388, 104 N E 735, Case of 
Bergerson, 243 Mass 366, 137 N E 739, Case of 
Johnson, 279 Mass 481, 181 N E 761 Where, in the 
case of a cumulative cause ofinjwy theie has been a 
change of insure?, it has been deemed essential that 
the employee, in oidei to establish the liability of the 
latei insui ei to pay compensation, pi ove the existence 
of a causal relation between the [108 Utah 129] 
employment during the penod coveied by its policy 
and the employee's injwy Case of Fabnzio, 274 
Mass 352, 174 N E 720, Case of Langford, 278 Mass 
461, 463, 180 N E 228, Case of De Fihppo, 284 Mass 
531, 534 [188 N E 245] The implication is that 
where no such causal ielation exists the employee's 
injury which results in his incapacity is to be legaided 
as having occuri ed pi wi to that penod and not at the 
date incapacity began ' (Italics added ) 
Applying this leasonmg to the instant case, it 
cannot be said that theie was any causal relation 
between applicant's disability due to sihco-tuberculosis 
and his employment duung the policy period of the 
Pacific Employers Insurance Company as insurance 
carriei 
The award of the Commission as against the 
employer, National Tunnel & Mines Company, is 
affirmed, and as against the Pacific Employers 
Insurance Company the award is annulled 
LARSON, C J , and McDONOUGH and WADE, 
JJ 
WOLFE, Justice 
I concui I desire, however, to refer to the case of 
Continental Casualty Company v Industrial 
Commission, 63 Utah 59, 221 P 852 The case 
involved a dispute between two insurance companies 
as to which of them should pay a compensation award 
enteied by the Industiial Commission The facts 
showed that one Sabey, while employed by Royal Coal 
Company, was injmed on July 18, 1922 The 
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insurance carrier for the employei at the time of this 
injury was the Aetna Life Insurance Company While 
still employed by Royal Coal Company on Decembei 
4, 1922, the employee, Sabey, was again disabled At 
the date of the Decembei disability the employer's 
insurance carrier was the Continental Casualty 
Company Upon the recoid made we concluded that 
the December disability was a recurrence of the July 
injury The Commission had ordered the Continental 
Casualty Company, the insurance carrier at the time of 
last disability, to pay the award We reversed holding 
that the Commission exceeded its authority *804. m so 
ordering, even though the same employei was 
primarily liable for both disabilities 
While this case is not directly in point, it does hold 
that in workmen's compensation cases, it is the 
insurance carrier at the time of the accidental injury 
which must pay the award even though said carrier did 
not carry the insurance at the time of the disability 
This is partly analogous to our holding that the 
insurance carrier at the time of the last exposure must 
pay the award even though it is not the carrier at the 
time of the disability 
© 2005 Thomson/West No claim to original U S Govt woiks 
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Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF") and Fremont Insurance Group, workers' 
compensation insurance carriers at different times for the Buehner companies, ask the Utah Labor 
Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Hann's award of benefits to S. H. B. under the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. '63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. f34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. B. suffers from silicosis/ caused by exposure to silica dust. He filed applications for 
hearing during February and March 2002 to compel Buehner and two of its insurance carriers, WCF 
and Fremont, to pay occupational disease benefits for his illness. On May 20, 2003, Judge Hann 
held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. B.'s claim. On November 24,2003, Judge Hann granted benefits 
to Mr. B.. Judge Hann declined to rule on WCF's and Fremont's relative liability for those benefits. 
Fremont and WCF now request Commission review of Judge Hann's decision. Freemont 
does not contest Mr. B.'s right to benefits, but contends the benefits should be paid by WCF, 
Buehner's insurance carrier during the last period that that Mr. B. was exposed to silica dust while 
employed by Buehner. For its part, WCF disputes Mr. B.'s right to payment of future medical care, 
Alternatively, WCF argues that a medical panel should be appointed to consider the medical aspects 
of Mr. B.'s claim. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge Hann's findings of fact, summarized below. The 
Commission augments Judge Hann's decision with additional findings regarding 1) the source and 
duration of Mr. B.'s exposure to silica dust and 2) WCF's insurance coverage of Buehner. 
For most of the time between 1967 and 2002, Mr. B. worked for Buehner as a sandblaster. 
During that same period, Mr. B. occasionally held other jobs. He was in the army from 1967 to 
1970, worked as a salesman from 1995 to 1999 and was self-employed between September 2000 and 
September 2001. Mr. B. returned to Buehner a final time during September 2001 and worked until 
January 11, 2002, when the company went out of business. 
Mr. B. was exposed to silica dust throughout his many years working Buehner. He was not 
exposed to any significant silica dust from any other source. On January 22,2002, only eleven days 
after his work at Buehner ended, Mr. B. underwent a lung biopsy that showed he had silicosis. Mr. 
B.'s silicosis was caused entirely by exposure to silica dust at Buehner. 
WCF provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for Buehner from 1998 through 
January 2002. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Commission will first address Fremont's argument that WCF, rather than Fremont, is 
liable for Mr. B.'s occupational disease benefits. 
Fremont and WCF each provided workers' compensation coverage for Buehner during times 
when Mr. B. was exposed to silica dust at Buehner. However, Fremont contends that, because WCF 
was the insurance carrier when Mr. B. was last exposed to silica dust, liability for Mr. B.'s silicosis 
falls entirely to WCF by virtue of the "last injurious exposure" rule. 
The last injurious exposure rule places full liability on the insurance carrier covering an 
employer at the time of the last injury or exposure that is causally related to the disability. See 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §153.02(1). With some limitations, § 34A-3-105 oftheUtah 
Occupational Disease Act^ adopts the last injurious exposure rule, at least with respect to employers. 
The question before the Commission is whether the last injurious exposure rule should also apply to 
insurance carriers. On this question, the Commission sees no reason to deviate from the precedent 
of Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 P.2d 800 (Utah 1945). 
The facts of Pacific Employers are similar to the facts of Mr. B. 's case. Mr. Deza worked as 
an underground miner for National Tunnel over a period of 27 years. He was diagnosed with 
silicosis in 1937. He continued working underground, where he was exposed to silica dust, until 
June 7,1943, when National Tunnel moved him to an above-ground position that d id not expose him 
to silica dust. Three weeks later, on July 1, 1943, National Tunnel transferred its workers' 
compensation insurance coverage from the State Insurance Fund to Pacific Employers Insurance Co. 
On March 25, 1944, Mr. Deza became disabled from his silicosis and filed an application for 
occupational disease benefits. 
All parties conceded that Mr. Deza was entitled to occupational disease benefits, but each of 
the two insurance companies that had provided occupational disease insurance coverage for National 
Tunnel argued that the other was liable for payment of Mr. Deza's benefits. After citing § 42-la-14 
of the Utah Occupation Disease Act (corresponding to the current § 34A-3-105 of the Act), the 
Supreme Court concluded that the date on which Mr. Deza was last exposed to harmful quantities of 
silica dust "attaches the liability to the employer's insurance carrier as of that date.. . " Because the 
State Insurance Fund was the insurance carrier on June 7,1943, when Mr. Deza left the underground 
mine and was no longer exposed to silica dust, the State Insurance Fund, rather than Pacific 
Employers Insurance Co., was liable for all of Mr. Deza's occupational disease benefits. 
While the Commission recognizes that the formulation of the last injurious exposure rule 
now found in §34A-3-105 varies in some details from the version of the rule addressed in Pacific 
Employers, those differences are not significant under the facts of Mr. B.'s case and do not undercut 
the logic of the Pacific Employers holding.^ Therefore, having determined that Mr. B.'s last 
injurious exposure to silica occurred at Buehner on January 11,2002, and that WCF was Buehner's 
insurance carrier on that date, the Commission concludes that WCF is liable for all benefits due Mr. 
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B. and that Fremont has no liability. 
Turning to WCF's motion for review, its primary argument is that WCF should have no 
liability for future treatment of Mr. B.'s silicosis because any such future treatment will be 
necessitated by his exposure to silica from sources other than his work at Buehner's. WCF's 
argument lacks any evidentiary basis, but is instead based on conjecture. Of course, whether WCF is 
required to pay future medical expenses will always depend on whether the then-available medical 
evidence establishes that the medical care in question is necessary to treat Mr. B.'s work-related 
silicosis. Subject to that clarification, the Commission finds no error in Judge Hann's award of 
future medical care necessary to treat Mr. B.'s work-related silicosis. 
WCF also contends a medical panel should be appointed to consider various aspects of Mr. 
B.'s claim. WCF's argument is once again based on speculation, without reference to any statute or 
rule that would require appointment of a medical panel under the facts of this case. Consequently, 
the Commission declines to require appointment of a medical panel in this matter. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Hann's award of occupational disease benefits to Mr. B.. 
The Commission releases Fremont from any liability for such benefits and hereby orders WCF to 
pay all disability compensation and medical expense due Mr. B. by virtue of Judge Hann's order. It 
is so ordered. 
Dated this 18th day of May, 2004. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
1. Silicosis is defined by Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27 ed., as: pneumoconiosis 
due to the inhalation of the dust of stone, sand, or flint containing silicon dioxide, with formation 
of generalized nodular fibrotic changes in both lungs. 
2. Section 34A-3-105 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act sets forth Utah's version of the last 
injurious exposure rule as follows: 
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational 
disease which arises out of and in the course of an employee's employment for more 
than one employer, the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose 
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease 
if: 
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that employer was 
a substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and 
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 consecutive 
months. 
(2) Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for disability, 
death, and medical benefits shall be apportioned between employers based on the 
involved employers' causal contribution to the occupational disease. 
3. The Commission also notes Professor Larson's comments regarding the continuing usefulness of 
the last injurious exposure rule: "This rule . . . is the majority rule in successive insurer cases, 
either by judicial adoption or by express statutory provisions." Larson's Workers' 
Compensation Law, §153.02(1). 'The last injurious exposure rule is also utilized in 
occupational disease cases, including those involving . . . silicosis . . . . The . . . rule is 
particularly useful for allocating liability in occupational disease cases, which often involve a 
number of insurers. " Larson's at §153.02(5) 
4. In light of the Commission's conclusion that the last injurious exposure rule is applicable and 
that WCF is the only insurance carrier liable for Mr. B.'s benefits, the Commission finds it 
unnecessary to address Freemont's request to join other defendants. 
